#### FEDERAL DEMONSTRATION PARTNERSHIP

Redefining the Government & University Research Partnership

### Plenary

- Foreign Influence Management – Advancing Understanding While Reducing Burden

Bridget Turaga & Jean Feldman – NSF

Michelle Bulls – NIH

Jeremy Ison - Department of Energy

Bindu Nair - DOD

Pamela Webb (Minnesota) and Jim Luther (Duke) - Moderators

**September 24, 2019** 



# Foreign Influence Implementation Discussion - Research Institution Perspective

Topic: The panel will share information on any
 aspects that have changed related to foreign
 influence requirements since the May FDP meeting as
 well as any actions being taken or are planned for on
 harmonizing requirements, definitions, processes or
 expectations among federal agencies. Current plans
 for FDP goals and actions in this area will also be
 discussed.



Welcome and introduction of the issue

Overview of the new FDP Working group and objectives

Agency / Sponsor Presentations

Discussion and Q&A



#### Welcome and Introduction of the Issue




# Welcome and Introduction of the Issue and Objective of the Session

- Key Environmental Factors
  - Complexity, Breadth and Depth of Topics
  - Pace of Change → Uncertainty



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August 2018

October 2018 - Present

July/August 2019

NIH Letter

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- Sharing of confidential information during peer review
- Failure to disclose substantial resources



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NIH Letter Foreign
Component /
Foreign Influence

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- "Significant"
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- NIH: Letters to Universities & ACD
- Congress: Sen.
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- NDAA, DoD, DOE, FBI



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- Affiliations & appointments
- Include nonfinancial support
- Talent Programs
- Other Inclusions?



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#### Overview and objectives

- Inter-FDP committee to promote coordinated response
- Foreign influence requirements identification
- Confirmation of the accuracy/clarity of definitions (other support, appointments, etc.)
- Plus understanding agency expectations (beyond simple requirements, what is needed)
- Institutional responsibilities versus investigator responsibilities
- Address issues that require input/dialogue
  - Restricted NOAs
- Documentation of burden and suggestions for burden reduction
- Promotion of harmonization across agencies where possible
- Coordination with COGR and other interested parties



- Michelle Masucci (Faculty)
- Robert Nobles (Faculty)
- Lori Schultz (ERA)
- Susan Anderson (ERI)
- Pamela Webb (Research Administration)
- Jim Luther (Finance/Audit/Costing)
- Doug Blackman (Export Controls/Research Compliance)
- Mary Lee (COI/Research Compliance)
- Robin Cyr (At-Large)
- Pamela Caudill (At-Large)
- Kim Moreland (At Large)

Interested? Please email Pamela (<u>pwebb@umn.edu</u>) and Jim Luther (<u>james.luther@duke.edu</u>) so we can email you when the group needs additional input or help.

# Foreign Influence Management: Advancing Understanding While Reducing Barriers





#### on Research **Protection**



July 11, 2019

#### Dear Colleagues

I am writing about a sensitive and important challenge that affects our entire science and engineering community. As you know, the National Science Foundation (NSF) is dedicated to maintaining a vibrant and diverse research community that thrives on the values of openness, transparency, and merit-based competition. With the support of NSF, this community is a major contributor to U.S. economic growth, national security, and global leadership. To maintain our robust research ecosystem, it is important that we understand and vigilantly address emerging risks to the nation's science and engineering enterprise.

A great strength of the U.S. research and engineering enterprise is the diversity of talentboth domestic and international—and that is a strength we are committed to maintaining. International collaboration is essential to pursuing the frontiers of science, as dramatically demonstrated by the incredible imaging of a black hole event horizon, the ambitious MOSAIC project to study Arctic changes, and the detection of gravitational waves on Earth

Our science and engineering enterprise, however, is put at risk when other governments endeavor to benefit from the global research ecosystem without upholding the values of openness, transparency, and reciprocal collaboration. Faced with such a risk, we must

Our values have not changed. What has changed is the scope and sophistication of the activities threatening our research community, such as certain foreign-governmentsponsored talent recruitment programs. These activities create new risks to the integrity of NSF's mission and operation. NSF is therefore taking multiple steps to mitigate these risks in concert with other agencies and stakeholders, as outlined below.

To ensure that NSF is applying consistent standards to all staff members, each of whom has access to sensitive merit review and other information, we issued a requirement in April 2018 that rotators working onsite at NSF must be U.S. citizens or have applied for

Earlier this year, we sent a note to NSF staff reminding everyone that government ethics regulations require accurate and timely financial disclosure reports and that Federal ethics rules, which apply to both our career and rotator personnel, cover emoluments issues and gifts from foreign governments

2415 Eisenbower Avenne, Suite 19100 Alexandria, VA 22314

Since 1978, NSF has required senior project personnel on proposals to disclose all sources of support, both foreign and domestic. A renewed effort is now underway to ensure that existing requirements to disclose current and pending support information are known, understood, and followed. For example, in May, we published in the Federal Register a proposed clarification of our proposal disclosure requirements (open for public comment through July 29). Our draft NSF Proposal and Award Policies and Procedures Guide includes clarifications regarding reporting requirements for both current and pending support and professional appointments.

To streamline the process for providing these disclosures to NSF, we are proposing use of an electronic format for submission of biographical sketches, including disclosure of all appointments. As currently envisioned, this will become effective in January 2020. We are also working to develop an electronic format for disclosure of current and pending support

We want to ensure we have expert input into issues related to open science and security, so we have commissioned the independent scientific advisory group JASON to conduct a study. This study will assess risks and recommend possible practices for NSF and its awardee organizations to achieve the best balance between openness and security of science. They will complete their report by the end of the calendar year.

Finally, we are issuing a policy making it clear that NSF personnel and IPAs detailed to NSF cannot participate in foreign government talent recruitment programs. There is a risk that participation in foreign government talent recruitment programs by NSF personnel and IPAs will compromise the ethical principles that bind us. Moreover, such participation poses significant risks of inappropriate foreign influence on NSF policies, programs, and priorities, including the integrity of NSF's merit review process-risks we simply cannot

We recognize this issue is difficult. We won't be able to make the changes needed to address this new challenge to our community without your input and support. We want to hear from you and look forward to working together to develop solutions, even if it means making changes to long-standing policies and practices. In the end, the steps we are taking and will take are aimed at protecting your vital research and continuing the kinds of international collaborations that are needed to promote the progress of science, to advance the national health, prosperity, and welfare, and to secure the national defense

Thank you for your continued support of our mission and we look forward to hearing from you. If you have any questions, please send those to research-protection@nsf.gov.

France Córdova





"NSF is dedicated to maintaining a vibrant and diverse research community..."






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### Foreign Talent in the U.S.


Doctorates awarded in S&E fields, by citizenship: 1998-2017





### Foreign Talent in the U.S.

Top 10 countries or economies of foreign citizenship for U.S. doctorate recipients with temporary visas: 2008–17







"International collaboration is essential to pursuing the frontiers of science, as dramatically demonstrated by the incredible imaging of a black hole event horizon, the ambitious MOSAIC project to study Arctic changes, and the detection of gravitational waves on Earth."



# What Does International Engagement Look Like?

- International scientific research collaborations with transparent and reciprocal exchanges for mutual benefit
- Leveraging of complementary skills, facilities, sites, and resources
- Accepting an invitation by a foreign state to simply attend or present work at an international conference
- Receiving a fellowship or participating in a scholarship program sponsored by a foreign institution that is focused solely on education or training





"Our science and engineering enterprise, however, is put at **risk** when another government endeavors to benefit from the global research ecosystem **without upholding the values of openness, transparency, and reciprocal collaboration**."





"To maintain our robust research ecosystem, it is important that we understand and vigilantly address emerging risks to the nation's science and engineering enterprise."



# Risks to U.S. Science and Security in a Global Research Ecosystem

# Research Integrity:

- Conflicts of interest / commitment
- Confidentiality of merit review process
- Protection of pre-publication data



Risks to U.S. Science and Security in a Global Research Ecosystem

NSF's approach emphasizes disclosure and risk assessment.



## **NSF Actions** to Ensure the Integrity of Federally-Funded Research

- Improved transparency/clarification for disclosure
- Streamlined processes for disclosure
- Additional review for overseas campuses
- NSF working group
- Risk assessment and analysis internal and through JASON independent advisory group
- Standardization of U.S. citizenship requirements and foreign government talent recruitment program participation restrictions for the NSF workforce



## **NSF Actions** to Ensure the Integrity of Federally-Funded Research

- Coordination with USG interagency partners, including through the Joint Committee on the Research Environment (JCORE) subcommittees on research security and coordinating administrative requirements for research
- Raising awareness within the scientific community through talking and listening



#### **Thank You**

NSF Office of International Science and Engineering

Bridget Turaga, <u>Bturaga@NSF.gov</u>





• NIH

• DOD

• DOE



## **Discussion and Questions**